Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses by Piazza, Fiammetta S.
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 5 
Issue 2 Contemporary Writings in a Global 
Society: Collected Works 
June 2017 
Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance 
Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses 
Fiammetta S. Piazza 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business and Corporate 
Communications Commons, Business Intelligence Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and 
Ethics Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, 
Technology, and Medicine Commons, International and Area Studies Commons, International Law 
Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, 
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, Rule of Law Commons, Social History 
Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
ISSN: 2168-7951 
Recommended Citation 
Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance Tools: Strengths and 
Weaknesses, 5 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 262 (2017). 
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol5/iss2/3 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2017 VOLUME 5 NO. 2 
BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN AS POSSIBLE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS: STRENGTHS AND 
WEAKNESSES 
Fiammetta S. Piazza* 
Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies are rapidly evolving and gaining traction in today’s economy. 
However, legislators in the United States and abroad are still assessing the legal status of cryptocurrencies 
and often pursuing quite different approaches in their regulation. On the other hand, the blockchain, the 
technology underlying Bitcoin transactions, offers itself as a great tool that should be implemented in the 
corporate governance field because of its recording certainty features. The blockchain, through the 
distributed ledger, allows users within a network to perform peer-to-peer digital transactions while accessing 
and monitoring changes in the ledger as they occur.  The ledger also offers an opportunity to maintain 
information securely, by encrypting and allowing access only to holders of cryptographic “keys”.  
Because of its lack of a centralized issuer and absence of securities deriving from a national apparatus and 
definite legislation, Bitcoin presents a series of uncertainties that prevent implementation as a corporate 
governance tool. Instead, the blockchain’s capacity to maintain confidential information securely, such as 
corporate strategies to be voted on by a board of directors or shareholders, within a network of allowed 
users and to record transactions or events with certainty should be explored and implemented in the 
corporate field. This article analyzes the current legal status of Bitcoin and blockchain technology; the 
relationship between the two; and advantages and disadvantages of implementing either or both 
technologies for transparency of ownership, corporate voting, accounting, and self-executing, “smart”, 
contracts purposes. This article suggests that while neither should be implemented for accounting and 
ownership reporting purposes, blockchain could prove a useful tool for corporate voting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
With the rapid evolution of the Internet and the transition to 
the Web of a diverse array of infrastructure and systems, virtual 
currencies have quickly developed. Today, virtual currencies play a 
key role in the transformational change affecting the world economy, 
reflecting the expanded venues available to consumers to access 
goods and services.1 Indeed, unlike traditional currencies, virtual 
currencies offer a peer-to-peer exchange mechanism eliminating the 
need for intermediaries and central clearinghouses.2  
  While virtual currencies are not afforded legal tender, they may 
still have equivalent traditional currency value.3 Within this category, 
Bitcoin has developed and attained primary market status among 
virtual currencies that can be exchanged for traditional currencies.4 
Bitcoin’s main feature is the so-called blockchain: a ledger where the 
parties to each transaction report their exchange. Accordingly, while 
the features and characteristics of each Bitcoin exchange may vary 
tremendously, it is possible, within the exchange and with the 
necessary access authorization, if any, to monitor transactions. 
However, this does not translate in complete transparency because 
some exchanges permit users to create anonymous accounts. While 
this is no longer possible in the United States following the recent 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) guideline 
making it clear the Banking Secrecy Act applies to Bitcoin even 
though it has not been recognized as currency, anonymous foreign 
exchanges may still impact American corporate governance because 
of the global nature of today’s economy and the ease of access to 
those foreign exchanges.5  
                                                 
1  International Monetary Fund, Virtual Currencies and Beyond Virtual 
Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations, 5, available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf.   
2 Id.   
3 Sarah J. Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Feature, Advancing a 
Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrenciy Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. REG. 495, 
504 (2015). 
4 Id.   
5 Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enforcement Network, Guidance 
Paper FIN-2013-G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons 
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Section II of this paper discusses, in subsection A, the general 
realm of virtual currencies and Bitcoin’s supremacy. Subsection B 
distinguishes between Bitcoin, blockchain technology, and distributed 
ledgers. Subsection C analyzes the mechanics of Bitcoin’s 
transactions on the blockchain. Lastly, subsection D, surveys the 
current regulatory framework regarding Bitcoin in the United States.  
Section III examines the consequences of implementing 
Bitcoin or the blockchain in the governance of companies. 
Specifically it examines the potential benefits and disadvantages of 
both as tools to enhance transparency, conduct corporate voting and 
accounting, and enter “smart contracts.” Ultimately, this paper 
suggests implementation of blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, may be 
viable in some of those areas.  
II. VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, BITCOIN, AND THE BLOCKCHAIN 
A. Virtual Currencies and Bitcoin: Evolution and Problems  
Satoshi Nakamoto – an alias6 – has long been thought to be 
the creator of Bitcoin when a technical paper was posted on the 
                                                 
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (2013) available at 
https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
6 While Bitcoin has developed since Nakamoto first published its 
protocol, the true identity of its designer (or designers) is still unknown. After 
posting the protocol, Nakamoto, other than for a few messages, has disappeared 
and, in his words, “[has] moved on to other things.” Who is Satoshi Nakamoto?, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 2, 2015 23:27) 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/11/economist-
explains-1 (discussing how, among other things, Nakamoto’s own funds have 
remained untouched). Several individuals and agencies, spanning from John Nash 
to the NSA, have been thought to be the “face” behind the Nakamoto mask, but 
no ultimate finding has been made. See, e.g. Justin OConnell, 10 People who have been 
Called the Inventor of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, CRIPTOCOINSNEWS (Aug. 21, 
2015), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/called-the-inventor-of-bitcoin-satoshi-
nakamoto/ (discussing the ten people who have been thought to be the inventor). 
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Internet describing the protocol in 2008.7 However, recent 
developments around the identity of Bitcoin’s creator identify in 
Craig Wright the true “father” of Bitcoin.8 Regardless of the identity 
behind Bitcoin, the protocol was first implemented in 2009 and, since 
then, several versions of the cryptocurrency have been created and 
are easily available for download.9  
Before explaining the functioning of Bitcoin and its role in 
today’s economy, it is helpful to remember that traditional currencies 
are defined as a system of money used and generally accepted in a 
country (or union of countries as in the European Union’s eurozone) 
as a form of payment.10 Traditional currencies are also known as fiat 
currencies from the Latin term fiat meaning “let it be done” or “so it 
shall be” in the sense of a governmental decree or order. This is so 
because, different from commodity-based money like gold, silver or 
copper-backed coins, fiat currencies do not have an intrinsic value. 
Instead, the national government, as issuer, declares its value as legal 
tender and, in the words of Milton Friedman, “[t]he pieces of green 
paper have value because everybody thinks they have value. 
Everybody thinks they have value because in his experience they have 
had value.”11 Indeed, fiat currencies are part of multi-layer national 
infrastructure inclusive of a national bank or system of banks (e.g. the 
United States Federal Reserve) and an agency or department 
                                                 
7 P. CARL MULLAN, THE DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLEGE – 
SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH U.S. FINANCIAL 
REGULATIONS 85 (Palgrave MacMillan eds., 1st ed. 2014). 
8 Following years of speculation, Australian Craig Wright has come 
forward claiming to be the original creator of Bitcoin. As proof, he “digitally signed 
messages using cryptographic keys created during the early days of Bitcoin’s 
development. They keys are inextricably linked to blocks of bitcoins known to have 
been created or ‘mined’ by Satoshi Nakamoto.”  Australian Craig Wright Claims to be 
Bitcoin Creator, BBC.COM (May 2, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
36168863.  
9 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86. 
10 Article, Ralph E. McKinney Jr. et al., The Evolution of Financial 
Instruments and the Legal Protection against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and 
Virtual Currencies, 2015 U. Ill. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 273, 274.  
11 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO 
CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 249 (1980).  
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entrusted with the production of currency (e.g., the United States 
Department of the Treasury Bureau of Engraving and Printing.)12  
A virtual currency is a “medium of exchange existing entirely 
in intangible form that is not legal tender but which can substitute for 
legal tender.”13 Within the broader category of virtual currencies 
often used for online games and social media are cryptocurrencies, 
Bitcoin being the most popular example.14 Cryprotcurrencies are 
distinguishable from other virtual currencies in that theyare “internet-
based virtual currenc[ies] in which the ownership of a particular unit 
of value is validated using cryptography.”15 Accordingly, Bitcoin is a 
virtual currency with equivalent value in real currency but no legal 
tender status, at least in most jurisdictions.16 
The American Constitution reserves to the Federal 
Government the power to coin money and regulate its value.17 
However, laws prohibiting the circulation and use of unauthorized 
instruments meant as currency or generally means of payment, have 
not been interpreted to prohibit new types of money.18 Instead, these 
laws have been applied for prosecuting counterfeited US dollar bills 
and coins.19 Nonetheless, many countries have taken a direct stance 
and have explicitly ruled that Bitcoin cannot be used as legal tender 
within their borders.20 Even so, private parties can agree, in contract, 
to use Bitcoin as method of payment for their transactions. Thus, the 
                                                 
12 Id. at 277. 
13 Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 3, at 504.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., CFTC Docket No. 15-29 (CFTC Filed Sept. 17, 
2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf. 
17 U.S. Const. art. I, §8(5). 
18 U.S.C. §336. 
19 Julie Andersen Hill, Virtual Currencies & Federal Law, J. 
CONSUMER & COMM. L., 49 (2015). 
20 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes – A Further Analysis, 
24 (2015), 
available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf. 
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biggest hurdles Bitcoin faces are volatility and absence of a 
supporting institutional infrastructure.21  
Between March and April 2013, “Bitcoin’s dollar exchange 
rose from about $50 to $350 and then fell back to near $70. Bitcoin’s 
price rose even more sharply during the fall of 2013, rising from near 
$50 in September to more than $110 by early December. During 
2014, Bitcoin’s price showed large day-to-day variations but generally 
trended down. By mid-January 2015, a Bitcoin was priced near 
$200”22 then, as of July 2015, Bitcoin was trading at an exchange rate 
of $279.32 per Bitcoin.23 However, it should be noted that Bitcoin’s 
volatility has been declining steadily and Bitcoin has maintained lower 
levels of volalititly compared to unstable reserve currencies like the 
Russian Ruble and the Brazilian Real.24 Specifically, Bitcoin’s volatility 
between March and May 2016 has been about 1.23% and around 
1.45% between April and May 2016.25 For comparison, and to better 
grasp Bitcoin’s level of risk, volatility of gold averages at around 
1.2%, while major currencies average between 0.5% and 1.0%.26 
Furthermore, “while gold has decreased by around 11% amid the 
[F]ederal [R]eserve’s announcement of new interest rates 
implementation, the price of [B]itcoin has increased to around 
US$430.”27 In 2017, in the midst of uncertainties surrounding what 
                                                 
21 Since most countries have abandoned the gold standard – the 
guarantee that anyone could trade a country’s currency in return for equivalent 
amount of gold – the value of national currencies derives from social acceptance, 
trust, and confidence in that country’s economy. The Global Monetary System – Not 
Floating, but Flailing, THE ECONOMIST (July 5, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21606322-after-150-
years-monetary-experimentation-world-remains-unsure-how. 
22 Craig K. Elwell, M. Maureen Murphy & Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin: 
Questions, Answers and Analysis of Legal Issues, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE REPORT, 7 (Jan. 28, 2015) (available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf). 
23 Id.  
24 Joseph Young, Volatility of Bitcoin Price Consistently Declined since 2010, 
BITCOIN NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 3, 2016, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/01/03/volatility-of-bitcoin-price-consistently-
declined-since-2010/.   
25 The Bitcoin Volatility Index, BITCOIN VOLATILITY, 
https://btcvol.info/. 
26 Id.  
27 Young, supra note 24.  
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policies will be implemented regarding Bitcoin by the new 
administration, “the cryptocurrency rose 3.1% to $1,164.10 
. . .topping the all-time closing high of $1,137 set in November 
2013.”28 February 2017, as a response to the newly inaugurated 
presidential administration, has indeed marked the longest Bitcoin 
has traded at over $1,000.29 This is because commentators expect 
“the Trump administration to be at least more accepting of the 
cryptocurrencies, even if they will not necessarily embrace them.”30 
This stems, at least in part, from the fact that Trump’s transition 
team includes “Bitcoin supporters” like Peter Thiel, co-founder of 
PayPal and investor in several Bitcoin companies, and Mick 
Mulvaney, an outspoken supporter of Bitcoin and founder of the 
bipartisan Blockchain caucus.31 Mulvaney, Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, has created the bipartisan caucus aimed at 
educating Congress about Bitcoin and blockchain technology.32 This 
is a significant step, regardless of political views, to foster regulation 
and thus certainty around cryptocurrencies and blockchain 
technology. Mulvaney has also stated that “[b]lock chain technology 
has the potential to revolutionize the financial services industry, the 
United States economy and the delivery of government services, and 
I am proud to be involved with this initiative.”33 
Hypothetically, and national debates aside, if Bitcoin’s 
acceptance becomes more widespread, its volatility may decrease and 
this, in turn, may result in increased global acceptance of Bitcoin as a 
                                                 
28 Olga Kharif, Bitcoin Price Sets Record on Trump Policy Uncertainties, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2017 10:35 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-23/bitcoin-price-sets-
intraday-record-on-trump-policy-uncertainties.  
29 Charles Bovaird, Bitcoin Price Tops $1,000 for Longest Stretch in History, 
COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2017 20:32), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-price-tops-
1000-longest-stretch-history/.  
30 Neha Thakur, Will Trump and Bitcoin be Good Partners, NEWSBTC (Jan. 
23, 2017 9:35 AM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2017/01/23/will-trump-and-
bitcoin-be-good-partners/.  
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Shivdeep Dhaliwal, Donald Trump Inauguration Special: Make Bitcoin Great 
Again!, THE COINTELEGRAPH (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/donald-trump-inauguration-special-make-
bitcoin-great-again.  
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means of exchange.34 However, without a national infrastructure 
backing the virtual currency, Bitcoin’s success can merely be 
temporary as in the case of mortgage-backed securities and other 
financial instruments in the past.35 Indeed, it has been argued that 
Bitcoin may become the subject of a financial bubble as it “seems to 
fit the basic definition of speculative bubble – that is, a special kind 
of fad, a mania for holding an asset in expectation of its 
appreciation.”36 News regarding price increases both publicize and 
amplify bubbles’ effects.37 They often justify the current bubble 
phenomenon by attributing it to an inspiring “new era” story aimed 
at attracting more attention as the prices rise.38 In Bitcoin’s case, the 
narrative was that “a computer whiz invented a new kind of money 
in the form of electronic currency units, as part of decentralized 
computer-driven system for a world economy that extends beyond 
the reach of any single government.”39 Indeed, commentators have 
speculated Bitcoin has already been the subject of a bubble in China 
in 2013.40 There, the Government has issued laws both banning the 
use of Bitcoin and prohibiting transfers out of the country of 
currency in amounts higher than $50,000.41 Interestingly, on 
November 3, the price of Bitcoin rose to its 2015 peak of US$377.36, 
amounting to a 75% increase since August of that same year.42 
Supporting the speculation that Bitcoin was the subject of a Chinese 
bubble, while the price rose globally, Chinese Bitcoin exchanges were 
                                                 
34 Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency 
Regulation in the Bitcoin Age, (Aug. 22, 2014) (available at SSRN 2485550). 
35 David Min, Understanding the Failure of Market Discipline, 43 (Mar. 3, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403988). 
36 Robert J. Shiller, In Search of a Stable Electronic Currency, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/business/in-search-of-a-
stable-electronic-currency.html. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Anthony Cuthbertson, Bitcoin Price Hits 2015 Peak Amid Speculation of 
‘Second Bitcoin Bubble’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bitcoin-price-hits-2015-peak-amid-speculation-second-
bitcoin-bubble-1526956. 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
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trading the virtual currency at leading prices, “sometimes trading at 
$10/bitcoin higher” than other exchanges world wide.43  
Historically, national central banks have been entrusted with 
the mandate of protecting their national currency by “seeking to 
match the supply of money to the needs of the economy and thus 
maintain[ing] price stability.”44 This result is usually achieved by 
attempting to make inflation rates as close as possible to set 
benchmarks. Those benchmarks are usually low, as in the 2% target 
of the United States, to avoid the uncertainty about the future and 
the corrosive effects on currency value that would be caused by high 
inflation.45 In fact, trust that a national currency is a reliable store of 
value derives from the confidence that the currency will be honored 
at a value reflecting public expectations.46 Accordingly, be it directly 
by setting interest rates,47 or indirectly by issuing public 
communications “prepared for the purpose of shaping economic and 
monetary conditions prospectively, as instruments of persuasion,” 
central banks play a pivotal role in managing currency stability.48 
Bitcoin’s independence from countries’ currency systems has been 
claimed to be its strength, however, while this may be somewhat true 
for highly unstable economies, it is not an automatic conclusion for 
more stable and confidence-inspiring ones. Indeed, regardless of the 
actual level of a country’s economic stability, it does provide 
consumers with an interface to relate to and that is neutral from 
private interests. Distinguishably, Bitcoin’s anonymous creation and 
the private ownership of all Bitcoin exchanges create a reality where 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Why Does the 
Federal Reserve Aim for 2 Percent Inflation Over Time?, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/economy_14400.htm. Similarly, in Europe, 
the ECB has a targeted inflation rate below, but close to 2%. See ECB, Monetary 
Policy, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/html/index.en.html. 
45 Sarwat Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, IMF, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm. 
46 Hilary J. Allen, $ = € = Bitcoin?, (Aug. 13, 2015), Suffolk Law School 
Research Paper No. 15-33, 15,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2645001.  
47 Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 75, 77 (2011). 
48 Douglas R. Holmes, Communicative Imperatives in Central Banks, 47 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 15, 17 (2014). 
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Bitcoin stability depends on the interrelation of conflicting private 
interests.  
Interestingly, according to its own website, Bitcoin’s value 
derives from the fact that it is “useful as a form of money.”49 This 
circular reason strengthens the fear that while the public is currently 
interested in purchasing Bitcoin because of trust in its development, 
if this belief disappears no central bank or government can provide 
support to users. A sudden end to the acceptance of Bitcoin as a 
payment method would translate into chaotic erosion of its value 
and, ultimately, Bitcoin would lose its status as currency.  
The lack of a neutral institution devoted to price stability can 
explain, at least in part, Bitcoin’s volatility and riskiness. In contrast 
to public sovereigns, Bitcoin exchanges have a private corporate 
nature and relatively easy access to bankruptcy procedures that could 
leave subscribers, as creditors, unprotected to a higher degree than 
they would be if a bank were to be insolvent. However, as mentioned 
above, Bitcoin is an interesting alternative in unstable economies 
where the national currency is completely distrusted. For example, 
Argentina is increasingly gaining interest in Bitcoin.50 Nonetheless, 
Bitcoin may not be the best option even in those economies. An 
example of a more structured and more reliable alternative currency 
is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (“SUCRE”).51 
SUCRE started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador 
and Venezuela. It was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar 
as means of exchange in order to limit and decrease the US influence 
                                                 
49 Bitcoin, Why Do People Trust Bitcoin?, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#why-
dopeople-trust-bitcoin. 
50 See J.M.P. Montevideo, Bitcoin in Argentina: If it can’t Make it there, THE 
ECONOMIST (June 12, 2014, 13:36), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/06/bitcoin-argentina; 
Nathaniel Popper, Can Bitcoin Conquer Argentina?, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Apr, 
29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/magazine/how-bitcoin-is-
disrupting-argentinas-economy.html?_r=0.  
51 Mercedes Alvaro & Jeffrey T. Lewis, Who Needs Bitcoin? Venezuela has its 
“Sucre”, (Jan. 2, 2014 6:51 pm), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304202204579256062854362716
. 
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and control over Latin American trade and, at the same time, increase 
stability of those markets.52  
While theoretically appealing, Bitcoin lacks the full faith and 
credit that has allowed national currencies to successfully function 
and resist crises.53 “No private issuer enjoys the same extent for its 
markets, the same capacity to coerce demand for its liabilities, or the 
same psychological association with confidence in society.”54 This is 
not to say that currencies alternative to national fiat currencies cannot 
successfully exist. However, it is of extreme importance that virtual 
currencies, by nature, tend to be unstable and extremely sensitive to 
new events requiring past commitments to be readjusted.55  
Consider the fate of bank-issued money in the United States 
prior to the establishment of the US dollar as the common currency. 
Many state banks issued their own IOUs with nothing but their own 
assets to back them. Predictably, they failed whenever too many 
claimants sought to make good on their claims at the same time. This 
follows from the hierarchy of finance and the fact that non-state 
entities, by definition, have limited resources. Critically, their ability to 
mobilize fresh resources may falter precisely when it is most needed, 
namely in times of crisis.56 
Accordingly, Bitcoin and other similar virtual currencies’ are 
too unstable to implement an overreaching corporate governance 
system like that applicable to companies. Doing so could potentially 
expose shareholders to greater risks than traditional transaction-
recording methods do without a countervailing benefit.  
                                                 
52 Id. See also generally, Caroline R. Hurtado, Note, Fiscal Policies as Decisive 
Solutions for Troubled Economies: Differing Legislative Enactments in Argentina and Ecuador, 
24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 391 (discussing the dollarization process 
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability).   
53 FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORIZED 
BIOGRAPHY, 75 (2014). 
54 Id. at 114. 
55 Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. ECO. 315, 322 
(2013). 
56 Id.  
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B. Distinguishing Distributed Ledgers, Blockchain, and Bitcoin.  
Blockchain and Bitcoin are too often incorrectly used 
interchangeably because of the strong association between the two. 
However, the blockchain is merely the technology through which 
Bitcoin functions and making the distinction between the two is 
fundamental to understanding the potential independent use in 
corporate governance of the blockchain, but not of Bitcoin, 
proposed by this paper.  
The blockchain is a particular type of distributed ledger and 
represents the technological evolution of a tool as old as commerce.57 
Indeed, in ancient times transactions were recorded on papyrus and 
paper, today, the same recording occurs in computerized form.58 
What distinguishes distributed ledgers from the traditional form of 
recording is that, through algorithms, the ledgers can be 
collaboratively created by all of those sharing it in a network 
consisting of multiple sites, geographies, and institutions.59 
Distributed ledgers allow all users within the network to access and 
visualize changes to the ledger as they occur while maintain the 
information safe from unauthorized access via cryptographic “keys” 
and signatures, controlling users’ relative powers.60 Indeed, 
underlying the distributed ledger technology lays the blockchain, 
which accomplishes peer-to-peer digital cash transaction in Bitcoin, 
or otherwise.61 This is further analyzed in the next subsection. 
Distributed ledgers, as contrasted to Bitcoin, offer an 
interesting tool to implement in corporate governance because of 
their potential positive effect in at least some field of governance 
which is discussed in Section III of this paper. Compared to current 
data management methods, distributed ledgers offer a more secure 
alternative given their resistibility to hacks. Unlike centralized 
                                                 
57 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, Distributed Ledger Technology: Beyond Block Chain, 5, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See infra Subsection Section II-c. 
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systems, a successful cyber-attack on a distributed ledger would have 
to contextually target all shared copies.62 While not completely 
immune from hacks, this technology is also resistant to unauthorized 
changes or malicious tampering because users can immediately spot 
those changes.63 The technology represents an opportunity for 
evolution in various fields given its adaptability to various uses: 
distributed ledgers are capable of applicability to most transactions 
given their ability of “guaranteeing and tracking assets as they move 
from one ledger to another.”64 Interestingly, various governments 
globally, are already moving towards the implementation of 
distributed ledger technologies paralleling the private corporate 
world.65 
C.  Mechanics of Bitcoin Transactions on the Blockchain   
Given Bitcoin’s nature, mathematical formulas and 
cryptography respectively control its issuance and use.66 While users’ 
software store a public record of all transactions – the blockchain – 
the actual identity of the transacting parties remains anonymous, as 
no personal information is required to create an account on the 
platform or exchange Bitcoins.67 Elimination of a third party 
intermediary, such as a bank, ensures anonymity within Bitcoin 
transactions.68 Anonymity is furthered by the absence of reporting 
                                                 
62 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, supra note 57, at 6.  
63 Id.  
64 Money with no Middleman, THE ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economistinsights.com/technology-innovation/analysis/money-no-
middleman/tab/1, (last visited May 10, 2016). 
65 UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT CHIEF SCIENTIFIC 
ADVISOR, supra note 57. Five countries (United Kingdom, Estonia, Israel, New 
Zealand, and South Korea, have also created a network of digitally advanced 
government with the goal of strengthening the digital economy. See UNITED 
KINGDOM CABINET OFFICE AND GOVERNMENTAL DIGITAL 
SERVICE, D5 London: About D5 Member Countries, (Dec. 9, 2014), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/d5-london-about-d5-member-countries.  
66 MULLAN, supra note 7, at 86-87. 
67 Id. (noting that Bitcoin’s issuance is capped at 21M units). 
68 Federal Reserve Board, Bitcoin: Technical Background and Data Analysis, 5 
available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2014/files/2014104pap.pdf.  
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requirements and regulatory agencies, such as central banks and 
taxing authorities.  
In the absence of a third party clearinghouse, participants are 
free, but not bound, to voluntarily record each transaction on the 
blockchain.69 However, the effectiveness of this recording method is 
disputable: users who record their transactions are rewarded with 
newly minted Bitcoins.70 Conversely, no penalty follows from failure 
to record.71 This incentive-based policy explains, at least in part, the 
steady growth of Bitcoin systems.72 
The blockchain is comprised of a series of transactions each 
consisting in a “block”.73 Each block indicates the asset and 
consideration exchanged, the time of the transfer, and the identity (or 
at least the pseudonym) of the transacting parties.74 Each block is 
“chained” to the preceding and the subsequent one through headers 
that report information (using codes) regarding the content of the 
previous transaction block.75 Thus, through the codes reported in 
each block’s header one can retrieve the preceding transaction block 
and so on until the original transaction is reached.76 However, while it 
is possible to trace Bitcoin transactions back to the original 
acquisition of assets, depending on the type of exchange used, it is 
potentially impossible to trace the transaction back to individuals.77 
Furthermore, depending on the visibility options set by the exchange, 
blockchain records may be publicly visible or restricted to authorized 
users and subscribers only.78 In the alternative, an intermediate 
solution has developed whereby a company uses a private blockchain 
accessible to authorized users only to record its daily transactions but 
then periodically updates and reports an aggregate version of those 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Id. (explaining that minting refers to the creation of new Bitcoins). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 PAOLO TASCA, Digital Currencies: Principles, Trends, Opportunities and 
Risks, Deutche Bundesbank research report (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657598. 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
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transactions on a publicly accessible blockchain.79 This intermediate 
solution is called, given its mechanics, a side chain.80  
Regardless of the accessibility options, to execute a 
transaction, both a private and a public key are necessary.81 Each 
party to the transaction has a private encryption key that provides 
access to their personal account and that, when paired with the public 
key, allows transactions to go through.82 Specifically, a transaction 
requires a “pair of interlocking encryption keys” acting as peer-to-
peer signatures.83 The use of digitally encrypted signatures to 
authenticate transactions is threefold in that it ensures the 
authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity of payment messages.84  
Moreover, Bitcoin transactions are final and irreversible: 
voluntary refunds are the only way to revert the effect of the 
transfer.85 Because there is no administrator, no transaction can be 
blocked or penalized.86 Furthermore, Bitcoin users have the option to 
either keep a Bitcoin wallet (also called dark wallet when kept on dark 
web87 exchanges), on their own or through third parties, or convert 
the currency back to their local currency.88 The latter option may, 
depending on the method used, entail a potential for identity 
                                                 
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 MULLAN supra note 7, at 86. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 8. 
85 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87. 
86 Id. 
87 The dark web is a layer of the web accessible only through specific 
software and where users can maintain nearly absolute anonymity. Stuart Dredge, 
What is Tor? A Beginner’s Guide to the Privacy Tool, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 5, 2013 
07:47 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/05/tor-
beginners-guide-nsa-browser (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).   
88 Steve Kovach, What It’s Like Using an ATM that Automatically Turns 
Your Cash into Real Bitcoins, BUSINESSINSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014 5:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-atm-2014-3 (on how to buy and cash 
Bitcoin). 
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discovery.89 Indeed, it should not come as a surprise that a commonly 
heard phrase in the Bitcoin industry is “buyer beware.”90  
As mentioned, Bitcoin further differs from traditional 
currencies in that no central bank controls the amount of currency 
available and no jurisdiction guarantees it.91 Instead, a mathematical 
protocol with no central administrating or monitoring authority 
generates the Bitcoin.92 Given its math-based issuance and incentive-
based transaction recording, while Bitcoin’s current cap of $21M 
should not be reached earlier than 2140, each Bitcoin unit can be 
divided into fractional units thus enhancing the currency’s presence 
and spread.93 The cap of Bitcoin availability tends to suggest a 
commodity-like nature, which will be discussed more in depth in the 
following section about Bitcoin regulation alternatives. However, 
unlike traditional natural commodities, Bitcoin’s cap is only 
mathematically enforced and thus easily transformable, which adds a 
further layer of unique complexity.  
Furthermore, software and services like TOR (necessary to 
access the dark web), the “dark wallet” (Bitcoin wallets stored on the 
dark web), and Bitcoin-laundering services which are intentionally 
designed to obscure the source of a Bitcoin transaction, enhance 
Bitcoin’s already anonymous character and further complicate 
traceability.94 Indeed, in the case of laundering services, the chain of 
transactions on the blockchain is obscured by “linking all transactions 
in the same [B]itcoin address and sending them together in a way that 
makes them look as if they were sent from another address.”95 Other 
services pursuing the same goal instead “comingle” different series of 
                                                 
89 This paper does not go into detail as to Bitcoin use in the dark web but 
suffices it to say that there Bitcoin’s anonymous features are extremely enhanced by 
additional layers of encryption. Id. 
90 MULLAN supra note 7, at 87. 
91 FATF Report, Virtual Currencies Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks (June 2014), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-
potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 As mentioned above, use of Bitcoin in the dark web offers further 
opportunities to avoid and evade regulation. Id. 
95 Id. 
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transactions, rendering the identification of the user to whom the 
sender intended to direct the funds impossible.96 
To further understand Bitcoin’s instability, it should be noted 
that Bitcoin acceptance peaked in 2013 with over 64,000 businesses 
around the globe accepting it as form of payment.97 However even 
lucrative businesses suffer from this instability, for example Mt. Gox, 
the largest Bitcoin exchange, filed for bankruptcy in 2014, after 
Bitcoin valued at around US$500 million mysteriously disappeared.98 
This example, considering the anonymous features of the currency, 
illustrates the great volatility and risks associated with the trading of 
Bitcoins.  
Enforcement agencies picked up on Bitcoin early, and, 
relatively soon after its creation, the FinCEN intervened issuing an 
interpretative guidance which is discussed in the next subsection. 
D. Current Regulatory Framework for Bitcoin in the United States  
Similarly to other virtual currencies, no Bitcoin-specific 
regulation has been enacted, nor does this paper suggest that it is 
necessary. However, a definitive categorization of Bitcoin as a 
specific financial instrument is necessary for market confidence in 
terms of legal certainty and clarity regarding applicable statutes and 
regulations. Indeed, while this article focuses on the dichotomy of 
Bitcoin and blockchain technology as potential corporate governance 
tools, it is important to understand that depending on the definition 
of Bitcoin as a certain financial instrument or another, its regulation 
may change considerably. Specifically, depending on the path 
followed, Bitcoin may function as a reliable governance tool. While 
legislatures are globally moving towards regulating Bitcoin use and 
exchange, regulation is not uniform as countries are following 
different approaches.  
This article suggests that, notwithstanding what the applicable 
regulation is, Bitcoin is not a suitable corporate governance tool 
                                                 
96 Id. 
97 Federal Reserve Board, supra note 68, at 5.  
98 Id. at 2. 
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because of externalities that render the virtual currency unstable and 
unreliable. However, to overview the current regulatory framework in 
the United States is helpful in understanding how unripe the legal 
system is to accept Bitcoin as corporate governance tool. Instead, this 
article suggests that, for at least certain aspects of corporate 
governance, distributed blockchain ledgers may represent a feasible 
and practical tool as discussed below in Section III. 
Given the lack of a universal definition of Bitcoin, its status 
and consequent regulation greatly differs depending on whether it is 
categorized as a form of money, a security, or a commodity.99  
 1. Current Applicable Law  
FinCEN has clarified in its 2013 guideline that, because of 
their anonymous features, Bitcoin users and exchangers are subject to 
the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”).100 Specifically, the guideline clearly 
states the BSA applies “to persons creating, obtaining, distributing, 
exchanging, accepting, or transmitting virtual currencies”, but does 
not go as far as classifying Bitcoin’s status. 101 Pursuant to the BSA, a 
“money transmission service” is a two-step service of “acceptance of 
currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one 
person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that 
substitutes currency to another location or person by any means.”102  
Following the FinCEN 2013 guideline, Bitcoin administrators 
and exchangers, in their capacity as Money Services Businesses 
(“MSB”), must comply with the appropriate Treasury Department 
registration process.103 Conversely, Bitcoin users do not fall within 
the guideline MSB definition and are outside the Treasury 
                                                 
99 For further and deeper analysis of Bitcoin’s regulation see, Fiammetta S. 
Piazza, Bitcoin in the the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and a Call for Global 
Response,  
100 Guidance Paper FIN-2013-G001, supra note 5.  
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. (emphasis in original); Money Services Business (MSB) Registration, 
FINCEN, 
https://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msb.registration.html, (last 
accessed Feb. 5, 2016).   
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Department scope of authority, at least for registration purposes.104 
The guideline also defines and clarifies that Money Transmitting 
Services (“MTS”) are within the scope of the USA Patriot Act of 
2001, which, among other addressed issues, imposes fines for, for 
example, failure to register and obtain a Money Transmitter license.105 
FinCEN’s conclusion that the BSA applies to Bitcoin 
represents a major turn towards a thorough regulation of Bitcoin and, 
by extension, of other similar cryptocrurrencies. 
 2. Status as a Form of Money 
“[Bitcoin] can be used to purchase goods or services, and 
[. . .], to pay for individual living expenses.”106 Based on this 
reasoning, a Texas District Court ruled on a matter of first instance 
and held that “[i]t is clear that Bitcoin can be used as money.”107 
While relatively limited in terms of market acceptance, Bitcoin “can 
also be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the US dollar, 
Euro, Yen, and Yuan.”108 Accordingly, the Texas court found that 
“Bitcoin is a currency or form of money.”109 The ruling is dated July 
2013, only four months after FinCEN’s guideline publication. 
While avant-garde and based on a sound reasoning, the Texas 
court ruling should be carefully approached. Indeed, even though 
Bitcoin is exchanged and used as money, unlike national currencies, it 
lacks the support of a central authority like the United States 
Treasury for the US dollar and it does not have intrinsic value, as do 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot ACT) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56. 
106 Id.  
107 SEC v. Shavers, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110018 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 
2013). (Addressing the issue of whether jurisdiction under the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 applied to the facts of the case involving a Bitcoin Ponzi scheme).  
108 Id. 
109 Id. (The court’s ultimate finding was that investors wishing to invest in 
BTCST provided an investment of money). 
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commodities.110 Because of the differences between traditional 
national currencies and Bitcoin, it has been argued that Bitcoin lacks 
at least one of two required characteristics to be considered a true 
currency.111 Specifically, although Bitcoin may be a means of 
exchange it is not a store of value.112 
Furthermore, in evaluating whether Bitcoin can be brought 
within the definition of currency, it is of remarkable importance to 
remember Bitcoin’s lack of national infrastructure, as opposed to fiat 
currencies. Indeed, other than in exceptional cases, a national 
currency can always be exchanged for and accepted as form of 
payment. Instead, Bitcoin could vanish both because of the 
combination of Bitcoin being the result of an Internet mathematical 
protocol, the absence of a physical “paper-trail” backing up the 
blockchain, and the Internet and computers being subject to 
viruses.113     
 3. Status as a Security 
The issue of  “whether the Bitcoin itself could be a security” 
has yet to be addressed by a court.”114 Indeed, while Shavers 
acknowledges it as an option, the court there did not delve into an 
analysis of whether Bitcoin can be considered a security instrument. 
The issue is even more intricate considering that, while there is 
agreement regarding the fact that a security is, in economic terms, a 
                                                 
110  Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 28, 
2013), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/bitcoin-is-evil/?_r=0.  
111 John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN. TIMES 
(Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4ad1bba0-61fa-11e3-aa02-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3sNu5guRP. 
112 Id.  
113 An example of a more structured and more reliable alternative 
currency is the Unified System for Regional Compensation (SUCRE). SUCRE 
started as a virtual currency for transaction between Ecuador and Venezuela and 
was intended as a medium to replace the US dollar as means of exchange to limit 
and decrease the US influence and control over Latin American trade and, at the 
same time, increase stability of those markets. Alvaro & Lewis, supra note 51. See 
also generally, Hurtado, supra note 52. (discussing the dollarization process 
undergone Latin American countries to obviate to economic instability). 
114 Daniela Sonderegger, Note, A Regulatory and Economic Perplexity: Bitcoin 
Needs Just a Bit of Regulation, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 195.   
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form of investment, there is not a uniform definition. Instead, 
different countries’ legal definitions vary, sometimes significantly, 
covering a broad spectrum of alternatives. In the United States, the 
Securities Act of 1933 comprehensively defines the term and 
provides, in relevant part, that “security means any note, stock, 
treasury, stock, security future, security-based swap, bond . . ., 
investment contract . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security’. . . .”115 
Over the years, American courts have developed and used the 
Howey test to determine whether an interest is a security pursuant to 
the Securities Act of 1933.116 In Howey, the court, beginning with a 
textual analysis of the law, reasoned that the preliminary issue to 
solve to understand what is a “security” is determining what is 
intended by “investment contract.”117 Specifically, the Howey test 
analyzes whether, at the time the interest is issued, the “investment 
contract,” and consequently the security, is “a contract, transaction or 
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise 
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or 
a third party.”118 For purposes of applying the Howey test, whether 
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates, or by 
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise, is 
irrelevant.119 However, Bitcoin’s analysis in light of the Howey test is 
ineffective, at least in part because Bitcoin’s features do not suit 
themselves.120 Specifically, while Bitcoin users may invest Bitcoin, the 
cryptocurrency itself does not generally represent a share of a 
common enterprise the investor believes will prove fruitful through 
the efforts of a third party. Thus, although Bitcoin may be used as a 
                                                 
115 15 USCS § 77b. 
116 SEC v. Howey Co., 293 U.S. 293.  
117 Section 2 (1) of the Act defines the term “security” to include the 
commonly known documents traded for speculation or investment. This definition 
also includes “securities” of a more variable character, designated by such 
descriptive terms as “certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement,” “investment contract” and “in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a ‘security.’” Id. at 297. 
118 Id. at 298-299. 
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security if the mentioned conditions are met, it remains unclear 
whether it does, unequivocally, qualify as such.121  
 4. Status as a Commodity  
Classical political economy defines a commodity as product 
or service produced by human labor and available for sale on the 
market.122 Regardless of school of thought, it is generally agreed that 
a commodity is a good, easily interchangeable with other 
commodities of the same type also used in commerce.123 Indeed, an 
essential characteristic of commodities is that their quality is 
essentially uniform across producers and are uniquely fungible.124 
Specifically, to be commodities, goods must be: (1) standardized; (2) 
usable upon delivery; (3) and their price must vary enough to justify 
creating a market for the item.125 As an illustration, agricultural goods 
like wheat, corn, oil, and coffee, energy-related goods like coal, oil, 
and gas as well as precious metals like copper, silver, and gold are 
typical commodities.126  
Unlike the unexplored status as a security, the US 
Commodity and Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) issuance of 
its first action against an unregistered Bitcoin option-trading platform 
in 2015, confirms that Bitcoin, and similar digital currencies, fall 
within the definition of commodities and are thus subject to the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”).127 While the CFTC’s action 
apperars to show a clear intent to regulate Bitcoin as a commodity, it 
might be an effort to at least pose some restrictions and promote its 
regulation.  
                                                 
121 Id. at 196.   
122 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: VOLUME I 38 (Int’l Publishers, 1967).  
123 Commodity, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/commodity.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
124 Id.  
125 Commodity, INVESTING ANSWERS, 
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/commodities-precious-
metals/commodity-1035 (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
126 Commodity, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/commodity.html (last visited Feb. 
6, 2016).  
127 In Re Coinflip, Inc. et al., supra note 16. 
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It is important to note that, significantly differently from 
traditional commodities, Bitcoin’s availability is potentially limitless. 
However, taking into account Bitcoin’s potential status as a form of 
money and its lack of an infrastructure typical of national currencies, 
Bitcoin’s availability is limited. This is because of the long-standing 
belief that currencies, typically currencies of countries possessing 
significant quantities of commodities or other natural resources, have 
been endorsed as commodities.128 Additionally, Bitcoin is notably 
different from traditional commodities, as it is extremely volatile.129 
For these reasons as well as Bitcoin’s virtual nature, leading to its 
unknown supply because of its algorithmically coded scarcity and 
future demand, some argue Bitcoin is more dissimilar to traditional 
commodities than it is similar.130 
In light of the general uncertainty surrounding Bitcoin, the 
CFTC has clarified “commodity” as a term to be broadly construed 
to include “all services, rights, and interests in which contracts for 
future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”131 Regardless, 
scholars are perplexed about the CFTC’s finding and suggest its 
implications may shake Shaver’s holding that Bitcoin can be a 
security.132 In the words of New York Law School Professor 
Houman Shadab,”[t]he [CFTC order] puts to rest any notion that 
virtual currencies qualify as securities. Otherwise, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission would be bringing this action, not the 
CFTC.”133 Unfortunately, no light is shed in the general gray fog 
surrounding Bitcoin even in this context because neither the SEC nor 
                                                 
128 Brian Perry, Forex Currencies: Commodity Pairs (USD/CAD, 
USD/AUD, USD/NZD), INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/university/forex-currencies/currencies8.asp (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
129 Bitcoin’s volatility is further discussed in Section II-A of this article. 
See supra p. 268. See, also, e.g., Young, supra note 24.  
130 Danny Bradbury, Why Bitcoin’s Volatility is Unique among Commodities, 
COINDESK (Apr. 29, 2014, 11:11 A.M.), http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-
volatility-no-other/.  
131 7 U.S.C. 1(a)(9). See, e.g., Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. SEC, 
677 F. 2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982). 
132 Pete Rizzo, CFTC Ruling Defines Bitcoin and Digital Currencies as 
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the CFTC have issued any disclosures following issuance of the 
CFTC order. Consequently, while it is undisputed that Bitcoin falls 
within the scope of the definition of commodity, no final 
determination can be made regarding its status as security.  
 5. The Federal Reserve, the Internal Revenue Service, and Other  
  State and Federal Regulators 
The Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen expressly 
stated during testimony before the Senate Banking Committee that 
the agency “doesn’t have authority to supervise or regulate Bitcoin in 
any way.”134 This conclusion was heavily motivated by the absence of 
a “central issuer or network operator,” which makes it “not easy to 
regulate Bitcoin.” 135 The Chairwoman has not offered policy 
guidance but has made clear that “[t]his is a payment innovation that 
is taking place entirely outside the banking industry.”136 
Taking a diametrically opposed approach, the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) has affirmed its authority over Bitcoin. 
Specifically, the IRS has clarified that it treats Bitcoin like property 
subject to property tax and that “sale or exchange of convertible 
virtual currency, or the use of convertible virtual currency to pay for 
goods or services in a real-world economy transaction, has tax 
consequences that may result in a tax liability.”137 As a means of 
comparison, the United Kingdom has moved towards a 
comprehensive regulation of Bitcoin.138  The HM Revenue and 
                                                 
134 Ryan Tracy, Yellen: Bitcoin ‘Doesn’t Touch’ Banks the Fed Oversees, THE 
WALL STREET J. (Feb. 27, 2014 12:32 P.M.), 
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135 Charles Cooper, Fed Chief Yellen: No Power to Regulate Bitcoin, CNET 
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Customs (“HMRC”) has issued a policy brief on the treatment of 
income received from, and charges made in connection with, 
activities involving Bitcoin and other similar cryptocurrencies, for: 
Value Added Tax (“VAT”); corporation and income tax; and capital 
gains purposes.139  While the country’s recent vote towards leaving 
the European Union will have consequences over this issue, 
currently, the tax treatment in the United Kingdom is as follows: 
acquisitions by mining are considered outside the scope of VAT; 
Bitcoin is considered a foreign currency for corporation and income 
tax purposes; and gains or losses on Bitcoin are chargeable or 
allowable for capital gains tax if they accrue to an individual and are 
not covered by trading profit rules.140 
Domestically, states have moved in the direction of regulating 
Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies through license systems. For example, 
New York has proposed a “BitLicense” regulation plan aimed at 
“help[ing] protect consumers and root[ing] out illicit activity.”141 So 
far, five more states – California, Colorado, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, and Texas – have also moved toward a similar and favorable 
regulation of the Bitcoin.142 Implementation of these systems of 
regulation, offer the benefit of ease of enforcement and monitoring 
because they offer the opportunity to conduct upfront investigation 
of Bitcoin issuers and exchanges.143 
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III. BLOCKCHAIN AND BITCOIN: POTENTIAL IMPLEMENTATION AS 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOOLS  
This section analyzes the potential benefits and detriments 
deriving from implementing Bitcoin together with or independently 
from the blockchain technology in corporate governance. This paper 
suggests that the present features of Bitcoin and its current under-
regulation do not necessitate its implementation because of the 
extreme exposure to volatility risks and hacks. However, the paper 
suggests the blockchain technology, as distinguished from Bitcoin, 
may instead offer a viable tool in areas of corporate governance like 
voting.   
The following subsections explore the relative benefits and 
disadvantages deriving from implementing Bitcoin or the blockchain 
in the corporate governance of companies as tools for enhanced 
transparency, voting, accounting, and self-executing contracts (smart 
contracts).  
A. Transparency of Ownership and Trading Value  
Transparency and disclosure are at the base of good 
corporate governance models in that they enable shareholders and 
stockholders to make informed decisions and hold corporate 
executives accountable, thus limiting the agency costs associated with 
asymmetry of information.144 In line with this perspective, countries 
globally have moved towards implementation of legislation aimed at 
enhancing corporate disclosures in a broad attempt at curtailing a 
greater role for shareholders in corporate governance.145  
                                                 
144 See, e.g., Benjiamin Fung, The Demand and Need for Transparency and 
Disclosure in Corporate Governance, 2 UNIVERSAL J. MGMT 2, 72-80 (2014), 
http://www.hrpub.org/download/20140105/UJM3-12101630.pdf.  
145 For example, in the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
requires publicity of information including roles of and responsibilities of board 
and management executives and the Williams Act of 1968 requires disclosures 
regarding tender offers. Sarbanes-Oaxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L 204 (2002); Williams 
Act, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 90 P.L. 439 (1968).  
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Transparency can be considered to be based on five pillars: 
(1) truthfulness, (2) completeness, (3) materiality of information, (4) 
timeliness, and (5) accessibility.146 Implementing distributed ledgers as 
a corporate governance tool could, at a minimum, result in enhanced 
timeliness and accessibility of corporate information. Indeed, as 
discussed in the previous section, users given access to the ledger 
would be able to track changes in the ledger as they occur thus 
allowing for timely transmission of information to shareholders. 
Shared ledgers would also address the accessibility pillar of 
transparency in that information stored on the ledgers would be 
readily accessible to all authorized users. The use of shared ledgers 
does not directly affect truthfulness and completeness of shared 
information, however they would allow users to easily monitor 
transactions as well as recognize possible breaches to the system.147 
Conversely, the same result may not flow from using Bitcoin because 
of its anonymous features as further discussed hereunder. 
Accordingly, this paper suggests use of blockchain, but not Bitcoin, 
in corporate transaction recording to foster enhanced transparency.  
In the United States, Bitcoin is undergoing regulation and 
exchangers are thus implementing amendments to their systems to 
comply with the BSA and, consequently, certain minimum identity 
requirements are now necessary for subscription as an exchange 
user.148 However, it is not mandatory for companies wishing to use 
Bitcoin in their governance to use local exchanges only. Indeed, just 
like a company may have international shareholders, it may decide to 
use an international Bitcoin exchange that allows reduced identity 
checks. Accordingly, because local regulation of Bitcoin exchanges 
are highly diverse in type and thoroughness, if any, using a foreign 
blockchain may result in non-transparent ownership. This would be 
so because of lack of disclosure requirements as well potential 
anonymous accounts.  
Use of local exchanges respecting the BSA could still not be 
sufficient to ensure complete transparency of ownership. Possible 
implementation of closed blockchains, accessible to authorized users 
                                                 
146 Fung, supra note 144, at 75-76. 
147 See, supra, Section II-B, at 274.  
148 See supra, Section II. 
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only, or of side chains, would de facto frustrate the goal of inspiring 
shareholders and investors’ trust in the company by way of allowing 
transparent and easy access to ownership arrangements and 
instantaneous changes thereof.  
Assuming full transparency is implementable, it would have 
remarkable effects on the behavior of players such as managers, 
investors, and shareholder activists. Using executive compensation as 
an illustration, this paper discusses the consequences of complete 
transparency. Specifically, regardless of the driving forces producing 
the final arrangement, managers’ compensation is often a 
combination of salary and equity.149 Currently, public companies are 
required to file with the SEC disclosures including executive 
compensation, however those filings do not necessarily come in a 
format easily comprehensible to non-sophisticated investors.150 
Implementation of blockchain technology could render executive 
compensation more easily traceable and quantifiable for lay investors  
because of its user-friendly interface. Indeed, while theoretical 
problems regarding whether executive compensation is optimal or 
whether the specific boards are beholden to the executives in their 
choices, complete transparency coupled with easier understanding 
would at least allow shareholders real time monitoring. This would 
enhance the shareholders’ role of serving as a check on both board 
decisions, generally, and executive compensation, specifically.  
Depending on the percentage distribution of each 
component, managers’ incentives tend to flow towards, more or less, 
shareholder-centered strategies. Indeed, acquisition and liquidation of 
managers’ equity in the company have become of central importance, 
especially after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.151 
Among other things, the act has reduced filing periods for managers 
to disclose their acquisition and disposition of company shares.152 
Indeed, while originally managers had to make such disclosures 
                                                 
149 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: Overview of 
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 443 (2005).   
150 See generally, Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ration Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html.  
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within ten days from the acquisition of disposition, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act has reduced this disclosure window to two business 
days.153  
While enhancing shareholders awareness, registration of 
company shares on a public ledger could undercut the effectiveness 
of equity-based compensation because trades observable in real time 
would have a lower value to executives as they could lose trade 
leverage or edge as a consequence.154 This might result in increased 
salary-based compensation of executives given the loss of value of 
their equity compensation.155 Furthermore, registration of shares on 
the blockchain would also result in higher consciousness by 
shareholders of when company shares are pledged as collateral for 
loans or in connection with derivative hedging product.156 These 
typical managerial moves may seem alarming to an inexperienced and 
uninformed market observer even when fully sound according to 
business judgment and could thus result in unwarranted market 
drops. Accordingly, while registration on the blockchain and the 
heightened transparency flowing from it can increase the role of 
shareholders in the governance of companies, it may also result in 
inefficiencies and obstacles in a board’s execution of its strategic and 
managerial role within the company.157   
On the other hand, assuming full transparency is achieved by 
implementing direct public blockchain systems, as opposed to side 
chain, the positive effects of transparency could still be undermined if 
Bitcoin is used. In fact, using Bitcoin to assess the value of 
transactions, here of compensation, and given the volatile value of 
Bitcoin, it would be quite possible to circumvent true reporting 
simply by assessing the transaction during low Bitcoin value trading. 
This would effectively enhance likelihood of circumvention of 
accounting fraud and misreporting frustrating the purpose of 
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154 David Yermack, Corporate Governance and Blockchains, (NYU Stern Sch. 
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legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oaxley Act. Accordingly, while 
intermediary fees usually associated with banking transactions may be 
avoided, this would be at the cost of providing executives with an 
additional method to circumvent honest accounting.  
Lastly, regardless of the blockchain used (Bitcoin-based or 
simple shared ledger) registering a company’s shares on the 
blockchain, would possibly also translate into added management 
costs, especially up front in the form of accountants and executive 
training, and system transitioning. Implementation of the blockchain 
could, at least initially translate in an additional layer of diversification 
of the board. Indeed, while accountants may be tasked with the 
mechanical registration on the ledger, the board should be aware of 
the consequences of certain timing of transactions. However, these 
costs do not seem justified given the high level of doubt surrounding 
the effectiveness of blockchain for corporate governance purposes.  
Accordingly, Bitcoin should not be used to record 
transactions, specifically executive compensation, because of its still 
unclear status and unstable nature. The blockchain technology behind 
it instead may promote enhanced transparency. But this heightened 
transparency may actually come at the detriment of shareholders, 
especially in the case of inexperienced investors that may not be 
familiar with typical corporate strategies and might misinterpret 
perfectly innocent board decisions. Accordingly, given the limited 
additional benefits of registration on public blockchain as compared 
to the current disclosures required by the SEC, it is advisable the 
blockchain too not be used, at least in this field.  
B. Voting  
Corporate elections, given diverse and spread ownership 
structures, are commonly held through corporate proxy systems. 
Currently, vote tabulation are subject to a considerable degree of 
inaccuracy resulting in certain cases in the inability to verify the 
question “who won?”158 
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Studies have found that proxy voting, while solving the issue 
of reaching quorums even though shareholders may be absent from 
the voting meeting, has flaws such as inexact voter lists, incomplete 
distribution of ballots, and problematic vote tabulation.159 
Implementation of blockchain could solve these issues given its 
accuracy and reliability levels deriving from availability of copies of 
ledgers to all users. In practice, voting via blockchain would be 
achieved by allocating eligible voters tokens (also called “vote coins”) 
in a number that represents their voting power.160 Voters would then 
transmit to addresses on the blockchain their vote, which would then 
be registered on the ledger.161  
Additionally, implementation of blockchain voting may defeat 
empty voting practices. Empty voting occurs when “an investor uses 
borrowed shares or certain combinations of derivative securities to 
acquire voting rights temporarily, without economic exposure to the 
cash flow rights connected to a share.”162 These voting strategies 
mostly rely on secrecy and, while legally doubtful, the difficulty 
connected to their monitoring and enforcement continues to enable 
them. Accordingly, a transparent system like shared ledger would 
effectively render empty voting impossible. 
However, empty voting is not necessarily a negative tool. 
Supporters highlight the efficient effects of the strategy in that it 
effectively permits pricing of voting rights according to the marginal 
benefit attributed to the highest-valued voter.163 Empty voting is also 
a great tool for minority shareholders in that it provides them with an 
opportunity to maximize their profit by selling or temporarily renting 
their voting rights.164 This view assumes that shareholders’ interests 
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are more focused on their profits per se than on actual active 
participation in the decision making process of the company. Indeed, 
whether empty voting is considered an acceptable practice also 
depends on what level of shareholder participation in corporate 
governance one believes appropriate.165 
Opponents of empty voting, instead, point out the potential 
undemocratic effect of disjoining ownership and voting rights, which 
could, especially where it is the minority that rents or sells its voting 
rights, turn against the very shareholders that are attempting to 
benefit from the practice.166 Indeed, where minority shareholders 
have, as it is common, opposite interests to the majority and control 
shareholders, selling or renting their voting rights to those parties 
may result in the support and passage of a resolution not in their best 
interests.167 Accordingly, the benefit of empty voting is strongly based 
on whether one considers shareholders’ interests to be those of  
immediate profit making, or long term and active participation in 
company governance. 
Independently from how one views empty voting, given the 
relatively straightforward use of the blockchain in the context of 
voting, this could be an area in which the blockchain could be tested 
for potential further implementation in governance. The removal and 
independence of voting from share value avoids the evaluation issue 
discussed above in the context of Bitcoin blockchains and could 
render implementation of such model feasible too. In fact, the tokens 
would be automatically assigned and would not be representative of 
value. Thus, the analysis above regarding Bitcoin’s volatility would 
not apply, rendering this specific use quite implementable even in the 
regulatory status quo.168  
Accordingly, voting via blockchain would effectively solve 
ambiguities about election outcomes and thus reduce opportunities 
to manipulate such results and would therefore be an advisable 
corporate governance tool. 
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C. Accounting  
Commentators have suggested companies may successfully 
transition to blockchain accounting and voluntarily post all their 
ordinary business transactions on distributed ledgers.169 This result 
may be achieved both through use of Bitcoin as a means of exchange 
for transactions or by reflecting the value of transactions via token 
amounts using blockchain technology. However, neither method 
implements a truly transparent system. Instead, both would allow for 
managerial manipulation because of the value assessment issues 
posed by Bitcoin and mentioned in Section III-A.  
Implementation of blockchain accounting could reduce 
accounting and auditing costs in that various units of a company 
would be able to directly and centrally record transactions into the 
ledger and thus there would be no need for an auditor to examine the 
books of every unit to then assemble them ex post.170 Furthermore, 
blockchain accounting would also lower the cost of auditing in that 
auditors and governmental agencies would have direct access to the 
ledger and be able to examine the regularity of transactions as they 
occur. This system would thus require extended access to the ledger 
by certain institutional players, such as taxing agencies, raising the 
issue of who is entitled to access those records. Accordingly, the the 
question of whose interests companies must pursue and what the 
objectives of corporate governance are affect the resolution of this 
issue. A possible solution to avoid overbroad access to confidential 
records could be to grant access to only those market player that 
would have access to SEC disclosures. However this could frustrate 
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the very purpose of blockchain accounting by denying access to more 
confidential information needed by taxing agencies.       
Furthermore, commentators pushing for adoption of 
blockchain accounting stress that this method would ensure complete 
transparency as the entire ledger would be immediately visible, 
assuming no restrictions to access are set by management, to all 
stakeholders, from shareholders to creditors, and from lenders to 
interested parties.171 While back-dating of transactions or amortizing 
operation expenses over long periods is not feasible given the time-
stamped nature of the transaction blocks, forward dating can be 
achieved by simply keeping a parallel undisclosed accounting 
system.172 Indeed, parallel accounting, be it on a side ledger or in 
paper form, would still offer companies an “under the table” 
opportunity to circumvent reporting duties. Accordingly, this system 
does not accomplish the result it purports to achieve: spotting and 
impeding self-interested and fraudulent transactions.173 Indeed, 
proponents of this type of accounting forget to take into account 
human nature. They assume a perfect reality where voluntariness to 
report all transactions at the moment they occur is the rule and self-
interests are nonexistent or not pursued. But how can a voluntary 
reporting system ensure transparency in a system, especially in big 
corporations, where ownership and management are quite separate? 
Considering transition costs as well as the above-described pitfalls, 
feasibility of blockchain accounting seems utopic and impracticable.  
D. Smart Contracts 
A smart contract is a “computerized protocol that executes 
the terms of a contract.”174 Smart contracts are not a wholly new 
concept, however, the advent of virtual currencies and Bitcoin have 
offered a way to reinvent this transactional product. Given Bitcoin’s 
rapid success among consumers, smart contract providers have 
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quickly developed and offer user-friendly interfaces.175 Accordingly, 
consumers may engage in smart contracts that vary from easy daily 
sales to substantive investments without going through traditional 
intermediaries.  
Technically speaking, the same concept at the basis of smart 
contracts applies from daily tasks like operating a mechanical soda 
machine to more sophisticated exchange market operations. The 
premise on which a smart contract is based is assuring 
performance.176 Applicability of this mechanism to blockchain 
technology translates in execution of contracts based upon the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of specific verifiable events varying 
from the passage of time to sophisticated contingencies such as 
financial outcomes.177 
While smart contracts may succeed and prove valuable to 
private individuals’ where timing and certainty of execution are key,178 
they may not prove successful as corporate governance tools. While 
smart contracts may reduce agency costs associated with debt, they 
would impose on corporations, and thus on boards, tight boundaries 
for strategic actions. As one commentator noted, the willingness of a 
company to enter into a smart contract in regard to a loan may be 
limited as it “represents a pre-commitment not to behave 
opportunistically in the future and it would protect a lender against 
fraud strategies by a debtor such as pledging the same collateral to 
two borrowers.”179 This effect may also prove legally unfeasible 
considering directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders as in the 
context of hostile takeovers and relative Revlon duties.180  
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Furthermore, the private nature of smart contract providers 
and consequent access to bankruptcy mechanisms for those 
providers, in addition to Bitcoin’s volatility, increases the risks of 
market bubbles and chaos were some of the providers to fail 
suddenly. Accordingly, however efficient, smart contract use does not 
necessarily translate into corporate governance benefits warranting 
the risks associated with committing to a set and irreversible course 
of action (once a smart contract is active and the set occurrences 
happen, execution is automatic). Accordingly, without prior 
regulation of the status of smart contracts within the realm of 
investment instruments, companies should not engage in such 
transactions so as to better safeguard shareholders’ interests as well as 
the overall company’s stability. Lastly, the complete automation of 
execution overburdens companies’ boards, thus, without a possibility 
to provide for “fiduciary out” mechanisms, smart contracts are not 
an appropriate corporate governance tool and should be left to the 
realm of private transactions. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bitcoin’s current under-regulated status and the lack of 
confidence deriving from the absence of assurances derived from a 
centralized bank and government backing, renders use of Bitcoin as a 
corporate governance tool unjustifiably risky. However, the 
distributed ledger technology of blockchains, as distinguished from 
Bitcoin, can, in some fields, represent an efficient solution. During a 
question-and-answer session with the Commonwealth Club Chair 
George Scalise, Federal Reserve Chairwoman Yellen herself 
recognized that, while Bitcoin is not within the scope the Federal 
Reserve’s authority, 
“[Blockchain] is a very important, new technology 
that could have implications for the way in which 
transactions are handled throughout the financial 
system. We’re looking at it in terms of its promise in 
some of the technologies we use ourselves and many 
financial institutions are looking at it. It could make a 
2017 Piazza 5:2 
299 
big difference to the way in which transactions are 
cleared and settled in the global economy.”181  
Chairwoman Yellen has consistently pointed out that 
“[blockchain] could have very significant implications for the 
payment system and the conduct of business.”182 Although the 
Federal Reserve is not currently exploring regulation, Yellen has 
explained that the Federal Reserve is, importantly, “trying to 
understand the nature” of fintech” and that she believes “innovation 
using these technologies could be extremely helpful and bring 
benefits to society.”183 Accordingly, regardless of political views and 
affiliations, the blockchain represents an opportunity to be 
pursued.184 Indeed, this article argues that blockchain technology is 
more suited than Bitcoin to be implemented in the realm of 
corporate governance because of its more reliable nature.  
In regard to the registration of shares to enhance 
transparency of ownership and shareholders’ confidence, neither 
Bitcoin nor the blockchain would better the current situation. Indeed, 
companies may implement closed side chains to hide, at least 
temporarily, some transactions and thus defeat the goal of enhancing 
the respective managing and monitoring roles of boards and 
shareholders.185 Furthermore, in the case of Bitcoin, its volatile value 
does not create trust in that transactions may be conveniently 
recorded during low trading value so as to allow executives to pursue 
self-interests and gain on the edge.186 Moreover, while the blockchain 
may avoid this edging issue, potential shareholders’ panic may still be 
a problematic consequence of complete transparency.187 Thus, while 
companies could create diversified access levels by creating different 
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keys, transparency, the very benefit that the technology purports to 
achieve would be capped at the outset similar to the status quo. 
Accordingly, implementation of either Bitcoin or the blockchain in 
this area is not warranted, as it does not enhance the current status of 
the SEC, and other similar, disclosures.  
The arena of corporate voting is, instead, one where 
implementation of distributed ledgers, and possibly Bitcoin, may 
bring about a better corporate governance model. Indeed, in this 
area, the actual market value of shares is unnecessary in the 
computation of shareholders’ voting rights.188 Accordingly, the time 
stamping and accuracy level guaranteed by block chain technology 
would probably bring about a better voting system. While use of 
Bitcoin in this area does not pose the risks and issues it poses in areas 
such as transaction reporting and accounting where value is key, 
Bitcoin’s use should, at least until further regulation is enacted, be 
paused in favor of block chain technology not using virtual 
currencies.  
Accounting represents the most problematic area in which 
block chain or Bitcoin could be implemented within corporate 
governance. Bitcoin’s volatile value is detrimental to implementation 
in at least two ways. First, fluctuations in Bitcoin’s value may actually 
further illegal and evasive acts of boards attempting to circumvent 
accounting laws instead of encouraging transparent and truthful 
accounting.189 Indeed, registering transactions at a later date would 
permit, through exchange rates, modification of the actual value of a 
company’s assets and liabilities.190 Second, and this applies to 
blockchain generally as well, this system of accounting is based on 
the false premise that boards are made of individuals perfectly able to 
withhold self-interests.191 Instead, managerial evasion of shareholder 
monitoring would still be possible, especially given the voluntary 
blockchain  reporting mechanisms. Also, implementation of such a 
radically different method of accounting would result in great costs, 
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thus, its relative benefits are not warranted, regardless of whether 
Bitcoin of mere distributed ledgers are used.192   
Lastly, while blockchain-based smart contracts represent an 
interesting evolution in the area of self-executing contracts, 
implementation in the corporate governance arena is not warranted 
because of board’s fiduciary duties issues. This is so regardless of 
whether the smart contract is based on Bitcoin currency, though in 
that case, implementation would pose the added dangers deriving 
from value volatility and lack of supporting infrastructure discussed 
with regards to accounting. 
Accordingly, because of its private and unpredictable nature 
as well as its current under-regulation, Bitcoin does not present great 
enough benefits to offset the risks deriving from its implementation. 
This is so especially in the American market and economy, which do 
not suffer from lack of consumer confidence in the national currency 
like other currencies. Instead, the block chain can achieve a 
progressively relevant status as a corporate governance tool. 
Accordingly, this paper discourages, at least in the current regulatory 
atmosphere, implementation of blockchain accounting and 
ownership reporting but does support blockchain as a corporate 
voting instrument aimed at ending empty voting and enhancing 
accuracy.   
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